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Calculating profit: a historical perspective on the development of capitalism 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The paper introduces the notion of different methods of calculating and analysing 
profitability as signatures of capitalism at different stages of development. Its point of 
departure is Bryer’s thesis of the capitalist mentality, which is subject to theoretical 
and empirical critique and developed in new directions. Interactions between the 
development of the productive forces and the socialisation of capital ownership 
jointly impact on these signatures, such that profit calculations are historically 
contingent. Aspects of feudalism, particularly restrictions on usury impacted upon 
accounting calculation, retarding their development. In the industrial revolution 
calculations reflected the scale and scope of specialised investment in plant, whilst the 
progressive socialisation of capital prompted a separate set of calculative practices. It 
was only in the twentieth century, with the unification of large scale industry and 
finance capital that the modern notion of profitability as return on capital employed 
finally developed.   
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The ‘Sombart thesis’ that it is impossible to envisage capitalism without accounting 
(Sombart, 1916), has been usefully extended first by Weber and more recently by 
Bryer. Weber (1927) suggested that the specific signature of capitalism was not 
merely double entry bookkeeping (DEB), as suggested by Sombart, but the existence 
of the capital account which supports rational computation of income yield through 
modern bookkeeping. Bryer (2000a, 2000b, 2005, 2006a, 2006b) develops the point, 
arguing broadly that what is important is the capitalist mentality, evidenced by the 
type of calculations that accounts are used for and manifested as accounting 
signatures. More narrowly, Bryer (2005, p.25) identifies capitalism with the 
calculation of rates of return and more specifically still, the return on capital 
employed (ROCE). In doing so, Bryer offers a completely new and ingenious 
perspective on the relationship between accounting and capitalism (Chiappelo, 2007, 
p.274). 
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 In view of the potential importance of Bryer’s contribution, this paper seeks to 
offer a measured critique of the arguments and evidence as presented primarily in 
recent papers in this journal and elsewhere, in the form of a systematic historical 
survey of profitability calculations. Whilst one might wish to be broadly supportive of 
Bryer’s approach as a means of taking forward this important area of debate, there are 
a number of points requiring further development before this can be done. First, if 
there is to be an understanding of the accounting and capitalism relationship as a 
series of transitions in the development of a calculative mentality, which is a feature 
of Sombart and Weber as well as Bryer, the role of scholastic doctrine in the 
retardation of such development needs greater recognition. Specific aspects of the 
feudal superstructure, the usury laws, the ‘just price’ (the social regulation of prices at 
cost of production), and related scholastic doctrine, significantly undermines the 
likelihood of feudal and capitalistic calculative mentalities as described by Bryer.  
Calculative mentalities described in such terms lead to a second problem. 
Accounting signatures, such as the feudal rate of return, which for Bryer (2005, 
pp.29-30, & figure 2) is the accounting signature of capitalistic merchants, and the 
rate of return on capital employed in production, signifying the full capitalist 
mentality, are questionable as interpretations of Marx, and of doubtful benefit as 
indicators of the transition from feudalism to capitalism. Finally, as far as empirical 
evidence is concerned, Bryer’s hypothesis predicts and makes claim to widespread 
use of rate of return calculations from a relatively early date. However, as will be 
demonstrated, when this evidence is exposed to detailed scrutiny, these calculations 
do not correspond very well to Bryer’s signatures, and fully capitalist return on capital 
employed calculations make a much later appearance than suggested in his previous 
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empirical surveys. As is the case with the majority of Bryer’s research, Britain is the 
empirical focus of this discussion. 
Return on capital employed (ROCE) requires careful definition, which is 
provided in detail below. In general it is defined broadly for the purposes of this 
article as the ratio obtained by dividing some measure of profit (as a flow of income) 
by some measure of capital (as a stock of wealth). It is evident however, that if ROCE 
is an accounting signature, there are a number of definitional permutations. As will be 
shown, the precise form of profitability calculations is historically contingent and they 
are subject to considerable variation. It is therefore necessary to offer a detailed 
definitional taxonomy of ROCE calculations, which is introduced at the beginning of 
the empirical section of the paper.   
The theoretical contribution of this paper is to show that variation in the 
method of ROCE calculation reflects the organisation of the forces of production (the 
economic base) and the socialisation of capital (the social superstructure) and the 
process of their interaction. As Marshall (1982, pp.115, 117) suggests, the division of 
labour and horizontal and vertical integration of complex processes call forth the 
capitalist mentality in the form of systematic profit calculation whilst at the same time 
economic conduct is a negotiated outcome of social action and ideological constraints 
on action. The accounting signature is thereby manifested in corresponding and 
contingent analytical computations of profit and profitability. In other words, 
accounting technique and calculation is the outcome of a process that includes the 
capitalist spirit or mentality. Such an approach contrasts with much of the literature 
which sees the development of accounting technique as a precursor or facilitator of 
the capitalist spirit of rationality (Sombart, 1916, Weber, 1927, Winjum, 1971), or 
indeed the notion of capitalism itself (Chiapello, 2007). It is however, consistent with 
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interpretations that allow the co-existence of techniques in the same historical period 
so that reasoning itself is not a sufficient explanatory variable (Lemarchand, 1994), or 
a legitimation process for pre-existing moral attitudes (Carruthers and Espeland, 
1991), or as signatures for categories of economic organisation (Bryer, 2000a, 2000b). 
Nonetheless an entirely new approach is offered to these debates by representing 
accounting calculation as a mutating dependent variable explained by the dynamic 
interaction of asset deployment and asset ownership. 
 The historical contribution of the paper is to re-examine Bryer’s and others’ 
evidence to show that accounting calculation as a signature can only be understood by 
the simultaneous consideration of the material basis of economic activity and the 
prevailing mentality. Admitting this approach suggests that instead of highly specific 
calculative methods as signatures of capitalism and feudalism, the evidence shows 
considerable diversity of method, unevenness of development and a relatively 
protracted evolution to what might be described as modern methods of capitalist 
calculation. In contrasting these to the methods employed under feudalism and the 
reformation, the paper answers a call for further research (Carmona and Ezzamel, 
2006, p.125) by providing examples of how religion creates and enforces a notion of 
social order, and how accounting helps shape and secure this notion of order. 
To develop these ideas, the remainder of the paper is set out as follows. The 
second section considers the computation of profitability ratios from the perspective 
of scholastic doctrine and accounting theory. It begins with a re-examination of the 
Sombart-Weber thesis and the origins of Bryer’s calculative mentality from the 
perspective of medieval scholastic doctrine. It then considers critically the 
relationship of Bryer to Marx, showing that Bryer’s exegesis of Marx places 
conceptual limitations on the application of an otherwise powerful analytical 
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approach. The section concludes with some theoretical support for a historically 
contingent taxonomy of profitability ratios. The third section reviews the empirical 
evidence, first through a re-examination of the case studies used by Bryer and then 
with reference to a second series of new examples which have not been referenced 
previously in the context of these debates. The fourth and final section draws 
conclusions.  
 
PROFITABILITY: A THEORETICAL RE-EXAMINATION 
 
Scholastic doctrine and the capitalist mentality 
Capitalism is defined for the purposes of the current argument as a system of private 
appropriation of profit at any rate independently of interest rates or labour effort.1 
Such a definition is convenient for placing accounting calculation at the centre of the 
analysis of the development of capitalism. The definition implies that capitalism 
exists concomitantly with the notion of ‘super-profits’. Capitalism is also about the 
private appropriation of profit, which is enforceable through contract and other 
institutions of law and governance. Because contracts are often incomplete, private 
enforceability is partial and therefore risky. The association between capitalism and 
excess profit also implies that there must be a measurement process, achieved by 
accounting techniques, such that profit can be ascertained. In Weberian terms this 
means the presence of calculable law, which would allow legal enforcement of such 
profits (Collins, 1980, p.928). Under pure feudalism, the required institutions of law 
                                                           
1 Transitional and fully developed capitalism are specific categories for the purpose of 
these definitions, both of which correspond to a generic definition of capitalism, as a 
mode of production characterised by the private ownership of the means of production 
by a class to the exclusion of the majority of the population (Desai, 1991, p.71). 
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that presuppose a legal and measurable surplus did not exist and the creation of such 
legal codes was strongly resisted by the church (Greenfield, 2001). Transitional 
capitalism, whose emergence coincides with the erosion of the economic authority of 
the church, is evidenced by private enforcement of profit rates obtainable through 
legally regulated interest rates or through the application of labour.2 Transitional 
capitalism and associated accounting measurement is thereby implicitly defined by 
the removal of complete intolerance to usury3 which characterised feudalism.  
These definitions suggest that it would be surprising to find return to capital 
calculations of any description prior to legalisation of lending to a prescribed 
maximum rate of interest in the reign of Henry VIII. Similarly under transitional 
capitalism it would be surprising to find such calculations that did not pay heed to 
usury laws and scholastic doctrine during the period of enforcement of legally 
regulated maximum rates. As in earlier periods, the law encouraged informers to 
enforce statutes against usury and oppressions including price fixing and other 
antisocial economic activities (Jones, 1989, p.93). It was however pressure from 
commercial interests on monarchs and parliamentarians that circumvented legal 
restrictions on lending (Tawney, 1925) and facilitated the rise of unbridled profit 
making. Dating this transition is more difficult, but as will be shown, the long lasting 
effects of scholastic doctrine deserve more attention than has been given hitherto by 
the empirical accounting history literature. 
                                                           
2 John Calvin (1509-1564) was the first to distinguish between business loans on 
which interest was acceptable and distress loans which should be made free of charge 
(De Roover, 1967, p.258, Noonan, 1957). In this sense Calvinism is an important 
ideological ingredient of transitional capitalism. 
 
3 In medieval times usury referred to the practice of charging interest in excess of the 
principal and since then as interest above the legal or socially acceptable rate (Visser 
and MacIntosh, 1998, p.175). 
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Restrictions on usury descended from tribal custom, Roman, and later 
ecclesiastical law, which opposed lending within the common group, and tended to 
permit it only when loans were made to groups outside the jurisdiction (Visser and 
MacIntosh, 1998, Weber, 1927, p.267-8) or came from sources ‘outside the 
brotherhood of Christ’ for example from Muslims and Jews (Aho, 2005, p.47). In this 
case, an important feature of intra-group transactions was elimination of risk through 
its socialisation, providing a material basis for feudal opposition to usury. At the same 
time, laws limiting gain from usurious contracts necessitated a parallel analysis of the 
nature of profit and its regulation through the notion of the ‘just price’ (Baldwin, 
1959, p.8). 
External trading activities created exceptions to the social elimination of risk 
and excess profits. ‘Sea Loans’ made between Italian merchants reflected differential 
levels of risk in voyages of differing length and perceived hazard and were therefore 
tolerable (Weber, 1927), as were interest bearing mortgages on trading vessels 
(bottomry) (Ashley, 1931, p.339-340). Most other loans considered usurious were 
opposed by the medieval church, culminating in the Council of Vienne (1311) (Aho, 
2005, p.44, Visser and MacIntosh, 1998, p178). In the rural communities of feudal 
Britain, usury was ‘at once too scandalous to be tolerated and too convenient to be 
altogether suppressed’ (Tawney, 1925, p.20).  
 Social tensions and latent conflicts between the Church and mercantile classes 
ultimately erupted into the Protestant reformation and the beginning of the withdrawal 
of the church from the regulation of economic affairs. The withdrawal of the church 
from economic regulation of society has impacted on the historical relation between 
accounting and religion. As a consequence, researchers today confront a 
profane/sacred divide, used by some religious denominations (for example the Church 
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of England, [Laughlin, 1988]) to exclude economic considerations from religious 
affairs, (Carmona and Ezzamel, 2006, pp.119-20). In other settings, from ancient 
Egypt (Ezzamel, 2002, 2005) to Islamic societies past and present applying the 
Shari’ah (Napier, 2009, p.125) there is no such demarcation, leading rather to 
intertwined practices such as those still found in present day Iona, which reunite 
theology and economic regulation, accounting for time and money in their social 
context, based directly on biblical teaching (Jacobs and Walker, 2004, pp.367-68). 
In the British context in particular Protestantism became the principal force 
behind the separation of the church from economic control. An important feature was 
the progressive dismantling of restrictions on lending,4 in which Calvinists recognised 
the desirability of lending within the rich elite who carried on business using 
borrowed money (Weber, 1927, pp.267-71). From this recognition follows Weber’s 
characterisation of capitalism as dependent on a calculable law and accounting’s 
ability to determine capital’s income yielding power (Weber, 1927, p.275). For 
Weber, this is achieved by striking the balance, a device first suggested by Simon 
Stevin in 1608.5 However this process does not explain how capitalists carried out 
their calculations, be it in terms of calculative mentality (Bryer, 2000a, 2005) or, as 
suggested here, that as capitalism develops, a number of possibilities for computing 
income yielding power arise. These might include residual income, profit margin, and 
returns relative to different classes of capital. Because all of these methods potentially 
                                                           
4  The 1571 Act explicitly allowed interest to be charged (at a maximum rate of 10%). 
A subsequent Act of 1623, amended this to 5% and there were further adjustments 
throughout the seventeenth (Grassby, 1969) and eighteenth (Pressnell, 1960) 
centuries. The framework of the 1571 Act remained in force until 1854 (Kerridge, 
2002, p.74). 
 
5  In Weber (1927) 1698 was inserted in error for 1608 and Stevin did not prescribe 
the drawing up of a balance, rather he referred to the practice common amongst 
merchants (Yamey, 1994, p.254). 
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contained elements of income acquired without corresponding labour or risk, or 
implied prices that varied from the cost of production, such calculations were made 
difficult or impossible by the restrictions of scholastic doctrine, including lending at 
interest under the usury laws. 
Scholastic doctrine therefore has serious implications for the development of 
capitalism, the capitalist mentality, and accounting, and moreover, represented the 
social enforcement of the labour theory of value (LTV). Aquinas and other Catholic 
scholars equated merchants’ money to their tools of labour so that lending to others 
reduced their capacity to work and therefore entitled them to compensation for 
enforced idleness (Noonan, 1957, p.127; Ashley, 1931, p.392). Even architects of the 
Protestant reformation such as Luther argued that merchants’ profits were indeed 
nothing more than the fruits of their labour (Tawney, 1960, pp.35-6), and condemned 
loans made at excessive interest (Marx, 1984, p.611, Homer, 1963, pp.79-80). The 
physiocratic sentiments of the LTV became even more embedded in orthodox 
political economy until the mid-nineteenth century (Tawney, 1960, pp.35-6), and with 
the emergence of the political economists came renewed attacks on usury (Child, 
1694).6 So, although Tawney is correct to suggest that the sixteenth century began the 
marginalisation of the church from economic affairs,7 hostility to excessive profit 
remained a feature of secular pronouncements. 
  In turn the political economists (for example Cary, Smith and Ricardo), like 
the medieval schoolmen, were proponents of the LTV (Meek, 1973). Mercantilists, 
                                                           
6  Tawney (1960, p.36) notes the first of these schoolmen was Thomas Aquinas and 
the last was Karl Marx. For, Marx the violent battle against usury is a demand for the 
liberation of commerce and the subordination of interest bearing capital to industrial 
capital (Marx, 1984, III, p.603) by political economists.  
 
7  
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such as Nicholas Barbon, writing in 1690, argued that ‘time’ was the determinant of 
prices charged by Artificers, whereas for merchants the source of profit was interest.8 
The political economists’ ideas reached their highest expression with Ricardo, for 
whom the LTV, located in productive activity, was the basis of attacks against the 
landlord class (Mátyás, 1985, p.15). It was not until the two decades following the 
death of Ricardo in 1823, when the LTV was adopted by representatives of the 
increasingly powerful working class movement (Hodgskin, Gray, Ravenstone, 
Thompson, Edmonds), that ‘orthodox’ economists reacted by rejecting the labour 
theory of value, for example Scrope, Read and Longfield, (Meek, 1973, pp.124-5), 
and began the search for an alternative theory (Bentham, Say, Senior, Bastiat). Utility 
theory, with its focus on the pleasure of the individual had its starting point 
conceptually in consumption (Mátyás, 1985) and legislatively in the laissez faire 
programme of the 1830s and 1840s (Polanyi, 1946).9 Marx’s persistence with LTV 
only confirmed its increasing isolation from mainstream economics. The spread of 
joint stock organisation and the socialisation of capital formed the material basis of 
the Austrian School, which, with consumption as its starting point, arrives through the 
process of economic imputation at the value of products through the value of the 
return, or capitalised expected dividends (Wieser, 1893, Mátyás, 1985, pp.19, 35). 
The history of the LTV has important implications for the history of 
accounting. Capitalism does not abolish the LTV, but through developing its own 
institutions, overcomes restrictions on its practical enforcement. During the scholastic 
and classical periods, the application of LTV to the of value to merchant’s profits so 
                                                           
8 Barbon (1690). Meek (1973, p.17) points out that the Artificers approach to pricing 
is inconsistent with the notion of profit on capital. 
 
9  For example, the Bank Act, 1844, the Anti-Corn Law Bill, 1846 and the Poor Law 
Amendment Act, 1834 (Polanyi, 1946, p.138). 
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that they appear as wages and the general social unacceptability of excess returns, 
suggest that it would be extremely unlikely that businessmen would use accounts to 
compute the ex post10 ROCE. As England’s economic base expanded from the 15th 
century, lucrum cessans became the sine qua non of partnership accounting, so that as 
Ashley explains (1931, pp.399-401, 404, 412-416), the ‘sleeping partner’ Italian 
commenda system was supplanted, and partners only shared profits if they shared the 
risk. Because profit making without corresponding effort or risk was restricted by 
scholastic doctrine and law, the notion of just price or a justifiable accrual to labour 
effort, merchants, where not fully respecting these rules might hide usury in an emptio 
venditio (purchase-sale) by simply charging a higher price on credit sales than on cash 
transactions (De Roover, 1967, p.260).11 Whilst such behaviour might allow the 
identification of profit on individual transactions, it was unlikely to promote the 
computation of profit at the level of the business unit.  
The principal corollary of the above review of feudal restrictions and their 
necessary impact on the transition to capitalism, is that profit rates, where calculated 
at all, might be expected to show deference to legally acceptable norms, in terms of 
interest rates, entrepreneurship as labour effort, and the avoidance of manifestations 
of excess profit other than in long distance trade. As the above review also suggests, 
                                                                                                                                                                         
 
10  Equalisation of risk through the Sea Loans system, associated development of 
insurance contracts, and the doctrine of lucrum cessans (loss of profit through 
merchants’ labour), led to the revision of scholastic doctrine by Cardinal Cajetan in 
the early sixteenth century, such that differences in expected risk justified ex ante 
lending decisions at differential interest rates (Noonan, 1957, pp.252-255). The 
parallel doctrine of turpe lucrum, or ill-gotten gains, which specified the remedy for 
monopoly profit at the expense of unknown persons, as the requirement to give alms 
to the poor [as opposed to restitution under usury] (De Roover, 1951, p.498) would 
have reinforced this attitude. 
 
11 Such methods are similar to Sharia-complaint murabaha transactions in Islamic 
banking (Napier, 2009, p.126). 
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the decline of scholastic influence and the LTV was protracted, and the decisive break 
in this mentality might not be expected until the middle of the nineteenth century with 
the socialisation of capital in the form of joint stock share ownership. 
 
Bryer’s capitalist mentality and exegesis of Marx 
Although Bryer has made a significant contribution to the notion of the capitalist 
mentality, his attribution of return to capital definitions to Marx imposes an 
unnecessary conceptual rigidity. Only two mutually exclusive profitability measures 
are used in Bryer’s formulation, corresponding to the semi-capitalist and capitalist 
eras and their transitional (or ‘capitalistic’) and fully developed capitalist mentalities. 
Respectively, these are the feudal rate of return and the return on capital employed 
(Bryer, 2005, figure 2).  The feudal return of return is defined (Bryer, 2000a, p.136) 
as the feudal surplus12 divided by the initial capital advanced, and ‘by contrast, the 
modern mentality aims to maximise Marx's capitalist rate of return, profit divided by 
capital employed in production.’ As the quote suggests, Bryer believes this to be 
Marx’s perspective, and goes on to say (Bryer, 2000a, p.136):   
From Marx's perspective, by contrast, only if DEB calculates the feudal rate of return 
on capital is there evidence of the capitalistic mentality, and use of DEB is only 
evidence of the capitalist mentality if it produces the return on capital employed in 
production. 
 
Elsewhere Bryer argues (2005, p.35) that accounting signatures of capitalism 
correspond to ‘capitalist’ ROCE calculations where there are depreciation adjustments 
(Bryer, 2000a, p.146) and the real subsumption of labour.  
 
                                                           
12 Feudal surplus is defined as the consumable surplus of commodities or cash directly 
appropriated (less collection costs) arising from forced labour, levies, privateering and 
royal charter (Bryer, 2000a, p.141); the examples cited correspond to Marx’s 
examples of ‘labour rent’. 
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 These definitions do not follow from the premisses of historical materialism. 
For example if depreciation is a necessary condition for the capitalist calculative 
mentality, it is not possible to characterise organisations that do not possess 
depreciable assets as capitalist. It would seem inappropriate for example to classify a 
financial firm operating from a rented office, and participating in the capital 
circulation process, as non-capitalist. A similar question arises for firms that do not 
employ labour, but which otherwise have obviously capitalist attributes, for example a 
self-employed businessman with a ‘rate of return’ mentality.  According to Bryer 
(2005, p.35):  
 
‘relative surplus value - the ratio of surplus value to wages - underlies the accounting 
rate-of-return on capital employed… [So] … the tell-tale signature of real 
subsumption is accountability for the rate-of-return on capital employed.  Present 
value calculations ex ante and rate-of-return or residual income calculations ex post 
provide evidence that management is accountable for the rate-of-return on capital 
employed (Bryer, 2004b)’.   
 
Present value calculations necessarily exclude depreciation and neither present value 
nor residual income calculations necessarily require deductions for depreciation or 
labour cost. Moreover, rather than characterise these methods as being sufficient 
determinants of the ROCE mentality, surely a historical materialist would find 
interesting reasons for such variants in the organisation and ownership of the means 
of production?    
Marx, meanwhile, makes no reference to the rate of return on capital, either in 
the feudal/capitalistic or modern senses. Instead, Marx is interested in the analytical 
device of the rate of profit. Marx (1984, p.42) defines the rate of profit as the 
proportion of surplus to the total capital advanced, where the latter consists of a 
variable capital component, corresponding to the capital advanced as wages. The 
fixed component includes depreciation and other materials costs. In other words this 
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is a revenue based mark-up calculation that is only reconcilable to ROCE through 
consideration of capital turnover, subsequently written by Engels in a separate chapter 
(1984, Ch.IV). The purpose of Marx’s analysis, supplemented by Engels, is to explain 
the relationship between the rate of profit, and the surplus value/variable capital 
component, not to present the reader with a textbook of contemporary accounting 
practice. As Engels points out (Marx, 1984, IV [F.E], pp.74, 76), ‘the amount of 
variable capital invested in his business is something the capitalist himself does not 
know in most cases’ and ‘…very few capitalists ever think of making calculations of 
this sort with reference to their own business…’.   
In summary, Marx and Engels do not believe that capitalists are interested in 
using accounting data to measure real subsumption, and as far as they are concerned, 
if ROCE calculations are made, they can only be without reference to the analytical 
categories of Marx’s formulation. Looking again at the last quote from Bryer above, 
because real subsumption (and the same might be said of depreciation) is not a 
necessary condition for computing ROCE from a set of accounts, it cannot be inferred 
that ROCE is a signifier of real subsumption (or a capitalist mentality in general). At 
the same time, where management is accountable for ROCE, it does not follow that 
they are at the same time managing the process of the real subsumption of labour. 
Indeed such calculations could be performed for a variety of other useful purposes, 
such as the reduction of a principal’s monitoring costs. Therefore, whereas in all 
probability the real subsumption of labour and accounting for the ROCE co-exist, 
using ROCE to infer real subsumption is insufficient. The small theoretical likelihood 
of a causal relation between labour subsumption and ROCE potentially draws a 
question mark over Bryer’s consistency with Marx’s historical analysis.  
 15 
Bryer makes only general reference to Marx’s account of the transition from 
feudalism to capitalism in this respect, noting that it is Bryer’s own project to derive 
‘the transitional forms of accounting that should appear from Marx's discussions of 
the transition’ (Bryer, 2000a, p.136, emphasis added). Although one possible 
interpretation of Marx, it seems an unlikely one since Marx, unlike Weber, gave no 
recognition to the calculable aspect of technology, or to the causal importance of 
calculable law (Collins, 1980, p.928). Whilst Marx (1984, III, p.610) acknowledges 
the role of usury and merchant’s capital in primitive accumulation, he downplays 
monetary factors together with inter alia economic ethics and the organizing role of 
religion (Collins, 1980, p.938). Citing Gilbart in a quote from 1834, Marx (1984, 
vol.3, p.610) suggests that ‘In our times, it is the rate of profit which regulates the rate 
of interest. In those times (referring to the period of regulated interest rates from 
Henry VIII to Queen Anne) it was the rate of interest which regulated the rate of 
profit’. In other words, Marx is not expecting Tudor and Stuart merchants, 
‘capitalistic’ or otherwise to be calculating profits other than with reference to interest 
rates as regulated by the usury laws. The implications are that the merchant’s 
calculative mentality would be informed by this regulatory framework, rather than by 
Bryer’s suggestion of the feudal rate of return.  
For Bryer, a further determinant of the rate of return mentality for both 
capitalistic and capitalist economic organisation is the development of socialised 
capital.13 For Bryer (2000b, p.328), ‘Marx’s theory predicts that feudal merchants 
                                                           
13 Socialisation refers to the pooling of money reserves, whether through banks or 
capital markets (Campbell, 1998, p.134), which as a process applied to ownership 
begins with partnerships, extends through capital markets to promote the mobility of 
capital (Marx, 1984, p.196, Bryer, 2005, p.29), to its fullest expression as pooled 
capital on a globalised basis (Henwood, 1998, p.241, Desai, 2002, Toms, 2005), as 
restrictions on the transfer of capital are broken down. In similar and parallel fashion, 
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only became capitalistic, signatured by their use of DEB to calculate the feudal rate of 
return on capital, when they socialised their capital’ (emphasis added). It follows that 
the triumph of the bourgeoisie in the mid-seventeenth century is nothing less than the 
victory of the rate-of-return mentality (Bryer, 2000a). The transition from feudalism 
to capitalism is explained thus (Bryer, 2005, p.30):  
Harnessing the merchant’s rate-of-return mentality to the farmer’s mentality of 
exploiting labour in production gave us the capitalist mentality of pursuing the rate-
of-return on capital employed. It was revolutionary because it drove farmers, and then 
landlords, manufacturing entrepreneurs and ultimately managers, to constantly 
‘improve’ production; to continuously increase the intensity and productivity of 
labour to earn an excess return on capital (emphasis added). 
 
An excess return on capital implies a rate above some required rate, which for Bryer, 
originates in the 1690s. First citing Marx, Bryer (2005, p.30) argues: 
in a word, it [the National Debt] has given rise to stock-exchange gambling and the 
modern bankocracy…whose full development dates from the founding of the Bank of 
England in 1694” (Marx, 1976, pp.919-920).  In these markets for social capital, the 
required return on capital appears and becomes related to market prices.  
(Emphasis added). 
 
 
Dating the origins of ROCE calculations and the notion of the required rate of 
return to the 17th century is however problematic since capital socialisation was 
relatively incomplete. For such an outcome to be possible, it would be necessary for 
fictitious stock market capital to be realisable through the expansion of the credit 
system, or in other words the unity of commercial and bank capital through the 
medium of the stock market. Such unity, as Marx suggests, was embryonic in 1694, 
and pushed backwards by restrictions of market development following the bubble 
collapse of 1721 (Neal, 2000). The inclusion of industrial activities in required rate of 
return calculations necessitated the further unity of industrial capital with bank and 
                                                                                                                                                                         
capitalist property relations emerge and develop from the internal contradictions of 
existing property relations (Dobb, 1946).  
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commercial capital, in effect the creation of finance capital (Hilferding, 1981), which 
would suggest the hypothesis, explored below, of the rise of finance capital in the 
early 20th century coinciding with the origins of modern ROCE calculations.  
Whilst offering a critique of Bryer’s approach, the above discussion has 
suggested that the analysis of the development of the productive forces in 
combination with the development of the social composition of capital offer an 
alternative method of understanding the development of the calculative mentality. 
This alternative approach is now explained in more detail. 
 
An integrated approach 
As the above review and critique of Bryer suggests, the use of rates of return ought to 
reflect the socialisation of capital ownership through the institutions of credit, banking 
and stock markets. In accounting terms, the socialisation of capital as it progresses 
implies new rules about the circulation and distribution of profit and processes of 
accountability through the development of DEB as ownership is widened and credit 
relations multiply. However, capital socialisation gives only a partial explanation of 
accounting for profit. Again, as the critique of Bryer’s approach suggests, it is 
possible to have ROCE calculations with or without labour subsumption, requiring a 
further analysis of the organisation of economic resources as an explanatory of 
accounting calculation. If such an analysis of the forces of production is added, a 
framework to explain the variety and transition of rate of return calculations can be 
developed as a dialectical relation of the centralisation of the forces of production and 
the socialisation of the ownership of production (Toms, 2005). As centralisation 
occurs through vertical integration, businesses become more internally complex and 
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accounting mechanisms are required to trace costs expended in production and levels 
of efficiency. Charging capital costs to departments becomes useful in this respect, 
but use of segmental ROCE remains problematic due to the presence of shared assets. 
On the other hand, as capital centralises through horizontal integration, ROCE 
becomes more useful as it provides managers14 with a homogenous standard for 
diverse businesses and allows them to manage without detailed understanding of the 
separate complexities of individual branches. The modern origin of ROCE has been 
linked to the emergence of such organisations (Johnson, 1984). Because they are 
relative latecomers, their accounting methods are more a product of the second rather 
than the first industrial revolution.  
Meanwhile as capital socialised in joint stock companies corresponding 
mechanisms for equitable distribution of profit emerged. Such arrangements lead to 
specific analytical performance measures such as dividend yield and price/earnings 
ratios, as opposed to Bryer’s ROCE. Even so, these do not appear simultaneously, but 
reflect the state of development of capital markets (Rutterford, 2004). If 
price/earnings for example is related to the degree of socialisation, then its use would 
be rare under conditions of thin capital markets, individual share ownership and full 
dividend distribution, and more common where there is capital accumulation by 
corporations whose shares are traded in deep markets, for example where channelled 
by investment institutions. However, neither centralisation nor socialisation proceeds 
in historical straight lines. The forces interact, so that changes in the forces of 
production can reorder socialisation, which follows from a standard historical 
materialist base-superstructure approach, but in addition, vice versa, so that ideology 
                                                           
14 ‘Managers’ as opposed to ‘agents’ are associated with the development of 
diversified businesses from the mid nineteenth century onwards and consistent with 
the etymology of ‘Management’ as a collective noun (Williams, 1976). 
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from the prior period interacts with the embryonic productive organisation of the 
next,15 thereby setting accounting calculations in the context of a historical dialectic.  
Bryer suggests that (2005, p.27) ‘the capitalist mentality drove revolutions in 
the technical and social relations of production in key sectors of the economy’. 
Instead it can be argued that the capitalist mentality arises from revolutions in the 
organisation of the forces of production, or the material base, which themselves 
ultimately arise from the physical and mental activities of the inventors. The physical 
and mental labour process of others is then subsumed in the economic base and 
capital is valorised as abstract labour in the superstructure. Following accumulation 
and capital socialisation the investing capitalist is confronted with abstract labour as 
accumulated capital. Accounting is therefore concerned directly with money capital 
circuits and the distribution of money capital and only indirectly with subsumed 
labour. In other words accounting is the administration of the social relations of 
production. 
The arguments presented so far can be summarised in the form of likely 
empirical relations that can now be tested against the evidence, utilising a wide 
ranging survey of the adoption of accounting calculations in Britain. Feudalism is 
characterised by conditions of dispersed productive forces and the absence of 
socialised capital as a result of economic underdevelopment and because restrictions 
on profit and usury limit the deployment of capital and its profitable accumulation and 
recirculation. Neither ROCE calculations, nor profit related calculations, occur under 
these circumstances. In transitional capitalism because either of the conditions may 
have broken down to a certain extent, partial calculations of profitability, for example 
                                                                                                                                                                         
 
15 For examples of capital market imposed ‘downsizing’ in the 1980s, see Jensen 
(1993) Toms and Wright (2002). 
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transaction specific percentages, annuities and residual income calculations that 
comply with legal maximum interest rates might be expected. The centralisation of 
the productive forces of capital and the socialisation of capital ownership are 
necessary conditions for the generalised adoption of ROCE calculations, which even 
so vary according to the precise historical circumstances. Centralisation occurs on a 
large scale for the first time with industrialisation, generating a corresponding 
requirement for social capital, but predating full abolition of restrictions on usury and 
joint stock organisation. Only when their influence finally disappears do modern 
ROCE-style calculations become possible and observable by the historian. In the 
review of the evidence that follows in the next section, this approach is contrasted 
with Bryer’s interpretation. 
 
ROCE CALCULATIONS: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
In this section, these interpretations are examined against the evidence, in 
approximate chronology, and as part of what is necessarily a wide ranging review. 
Before examining the evidence, an important methodological caveat is required. 
Feudalism, transitional capitalism and modern capitalism are periodised and thereby 
made exogenous with reference to standard authorities on economic history. Without 
ex ante periodisation, any argument becomes a potentially tautological association of 
accounting calculation with certain economic epochs and patterns of capital 
ownership. For the purposes of this analysis, the end of feudalism in Britain dates to 
around 1500, so that transitional capitalism encompasses the discovery of new 
markets, and the rise of the seaborne empires which set the scene for the Tudor’s 
enacting of laws facilitating the expropriation of the poor (Marx, 1976, ch.28) and the 
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first removals of outright restrictions on usury (Tawney, 1925). The onset of modern 
capitalism dates from the 1840s when a series of legislative acts removed restrictions 
on unbridled profit making (Polanyi, 1946).  
In the two sub-sections that follow, the evidence presented by Bryer on the use 
of ROCE calculations is examined, with reference to instances of Bryer’s feudal rate 
of return and Bryer’s modern return on capital employed (hereafter labelled ROCEBF 
and ROCEBC respectively). The following section deals with other cases not dealt 
with by Bryer in an effort to widen further the evidence base on profitability 
calculations. There is a multiplicity of different methods of computing rates of return 
and to assist the reader, tabulations are used. Table 1 provides a definitional taxonomy 
of the calculative methods discussed with an abbreviation and definition for each. 
Table 2 provides an analysis of the examples directly cited by Bryer (2005) and 
elsewhere (2000b, 2006b) of uses of the ROCE measure. Selected calculations used 
by others not cited by Bryer are shown in Table 3. The table shows the name of the 
entrepreneur or business, the date at which the ROCE calculation was observed and 
the industry in which the firm was involved. The next column provides a summary of 
the method used, and in Table 2 where Bryer makes a claim of ROCE, the method 
described in the original source cited by Bryer is also outlined in italic underneath as a 
commentary. 
 
Table 1 about here 
Table 2 about here 
Table 3 about here 
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Bryer’s evidence on ROCE calculations 
According Bryer, (2005, p.29) joint-stock trading companies ‘were the first to pursue 
a rate of return on capital using DEB’16. These were ‘semi-capitalist’ because they 
calculated the ‘feudal rate of return’ by taking ‘feudal surplus’ and dividing it by 
initial capital advanced. However, as Baladouni points out (1986, p.28) in the case of 
the East India Company, and as the evidence from Grassby (1969) suggests, there was 
no consistent conceptual framework underlying these calculations.17 Whilst there is 
certainly evidence that some merchants in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, of 
the East India Company [EIC] (Chaudhuri, 1965), and others (Grassby, 1969, p.749) 
did calculate rates of return, and in the case of the EIC calculations responded to the 
socialisation of capital (Bryer, 2000b, p.365), they did so in a context of colonisation 
and licensed privateering and associated profit sharing calculations (Andrews, 1964, 
p.16). As discussed earlier, in the feudal period excess profits and usurious gains were 
acceptable where earned at the expense of foreigners, which in the case of such gains 
from the Indian trade were dealt with secretively (Grassby, 1995, p.238). Grassby 
provides exhaustive evidence of rate of return calculations (1995, pp. 234-36), but 
stresses that contemporary calculations were usually gross profits on particular 
transactions, in most cases assisting the merchant with the pricing decision, and that 
‘merchants rarely calculated their net return on capital.’ (1995, p. 236).  
Socialisation also implies profit sharing within legally established rules and 
social norms which changed as a function of the latent conflict between medieval 
                                                           
16 For Bryer, the pursuit of a rate of return is the product of the corresponding 
mentality, which is related to calculative method and the social relations of production 
(Bryer, 2005, p.28). 
 
17 The political economist Thomas Munne suggested an investors’ target ratio of value 
returned to value invested of 3.5 to 1, which would seem to approximate to the notion 
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laws on usury, discussed above, and the steady accumulation of mercantile profit. In 
the 1570s there is no evidence that woollen merchant John Isham calculated return on 
capital or that this could have been done accurately (Ramsay, 1962, p.lxxxiii). 
Throughout the period 1494-1840, balances were struck irregularly and the capital 
account provided no basis for rational calculation (Pollard, 1963, p.78). Merchants’ 
ledgers of the seventeenth century did not give them the means to compute the return 
on capital, but their accounts did record transactions (Grassby, 1969), giving them the 
financial control and accountability they needed (see the example of Monteage 
below). So whilst capital socialisation provides a convincing explanation of the 
adoption of DEB in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and risk related profit 
sharing schemes (Bryer, 2000b, pp. 336-7), it provides a far less convincing story of 
the adoption of an ROCE-based calculative mentality.    
The earliest example of such a mentality cited by Bryer is Robert Loder who 
developed ‘a single entry system for calculating the return on capital’ (Bryer, 2000b, 
p.376) and who in 1611, was performing residual income calculations (Bryer, 2005, 
p.39, table 2). For Bryer, Loder is a transitional character, half feudal, half capitalist. 
Loder apparently ‘capitalised interest as a cost of production’ which ‘is evidence of a 
feudal mentality’ (Bryer, 2000b, p.373). However, interest capitalisation is not 
obviously feudal. In modern accounting it can be quite legitimate to add interest 
charges to the capitalised cost of fixed assets, for example FAS34 and IAS23 both 
consider the circumstances in which such capitalisation is appropriate.18 Loder also 
charged 10% on the capital tied up in his crops as a deduction from his surplus and 
                                                                                                                                                                         
of a rate of return (Chaudhuri, 1965, p.67). At the Dutch East India Company ‘the 
strict notion of profit was never grasped…’ (Levy, 1950, vol. 1, p.19). 
 
18 http://www.iasplus.com/standard/ias23.htm. 
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according to Bryer (2000b, p.373), ‘charging notional interest on total capital 
employed to divide the surplus between the required rate of return on capital and the 
residual income is evidence of the modern capitalist mentality’ (see also, Bryer, 1994, 
p.225).  
An alternative explanation is that such calculations reflected the productive 
forces employed and the process of social accountability. So the charge was partial, 
applied only to that proportion of capital tied up in crops and not the other assets such 
as livestock etc which are listed in Loder’s 1611 balance sheet (Bryer, 2000b, p.372) 
and, as Bryer says (2000b, p.373), ‘he fails to account for all his fixed capital’. The 
10% charge, as Bryer acknowledges, was the maximum rate decreed by the usury 
laws (Bryer, 1994, p.225), and corresponds to the rate of interest then in force 
following the Act of 1571. According to Jones (1989, p.79): ‘By the early seventeenth 
century people had become so inured to 10 per cent as the proper rate for a loan, they 
began to record it openly in their accounts’.19 As Scorgie suggests citing Edwards and 
Newell, 1990, p.52) 'the use of interest may well have its origins in landed estate 
accountancy.' He also points out that as discounting became more widespread, the rate 
of usury effectively became the discount rate, as evidenced by Culpepper’s arguments 
before parliament in 1621 (Scorgie, 1996, p.242). For Loder, the surplus beyond the 
legal rate corresponded to reasonable remuneration for his labour according to 
medieval scholastic doctrine. As Fussell (1936, p.xxiii) points out, his objective was 
to make a living from his estate and obtain the maximum return from his expenditure 
of capital and his managerial and manual labour. Therefore it does not make sense to 
quantify the latter two components of the investment as a rate of return. Instead, it is 
                                                           
19 Jones cites the example of the accounts of Thomas Harvey, the London agent of the 
Earl of Huntington, 1606-1613. 
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sensible to compute it as an amount, in the seventeenth century sense as a reward for 
husbandry (Tribe, 1978, pp.54-59) having deducted the charge for capital. Like the 
merchants, Loder was concerned with profit on specific activities in its relation to 
revenue, as the main emphasis of his accounts show, so that his concern was with the 
gross margin (Freear, 1994). Whilst mark-up calculations were useful to merchants 
for pricing, commission and customs calculations, the purpose of the ‘feudal rate of 
return’ seems less obvious.  
In the second example listed in table 2, Bryer (2005, p.37) claims that 
‘Monteage’s system calculated the feudal rate of return’, defined as the feudal surplus 
added to the initial capital, where the feudal surplus excludes allocation of overheads 
to products. It is not the case that such feudal rates of return were calculated, for a 
number of reasons. In Monteage’s (1675) example set of books, Grange Farm is one 
activity for a gentleman who also owns a manor and invests in commercial voyages. 
To account for this collection of activities, Monteage advocates a specific order, begin 
with loss and gain from the ‘Grange Farm’ account and other activities and then carry 
the balances to the ‘Stock’ account, the loss and gain representing the increase in 
value of the Stock account (in the form of a net gain). The value on the ‘Stock' 
account is then taken to the ‘Balance’ account of outstanding debtors and creditors. 
The purpose of closing the three accounts in this order is to act as a check against 
error. Indeed the system Monteage advocates is remarkably similar to the extraction 
of a trial balance from the underlying books of account. So the next step is to add 
opening debits and credits to debits and credits from the profit and loss account and 
the netted off result added to the outstanding balance sheet debits and credits to be 
carried forward. In other words the profit is not just the difference between closing 
capital and capital realised and opening capital and other expenditure (as suggested by 
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Bryer, 2005, p.37), it is the figure that reconciles profits from diverse activities with 
opening capital and difference between outstanding assets and liabilities at the end of 
the year.   
Further reasons why this example does not correspond to Bryer’s feudal rate 
of return arise from the treatment of taxation, wages and depreciation in Monteage’s 
example. In the case of Grange Farm, there is a taxation charge, which would 
normally be considered an overhead, and certainly in the case of Bryer’s definition of 
feudal surplus, should necessarily be excluded from this departmental account. 
Grange Farm’s account also shows that wages were paid.20 As Bryer (1994, p.317) 
suggests correctly, from Marx’s perspective feudal surplus was based on labour 
coercion, implying an absence of wage labour. Bryer (2005, 2006a, p.370) then 
argues that where farmers use feudal surplus semi-capitalistically ‘they accounted for 
feudal surplus as the increment to initial capital, that is, for the feudal rate-of-
return’.21 It is possible Besse Hobbes22 could have her labour coerced and be paid 
wages at the same time, but even if that is the case it is not clear from Monteage’s 
(1675) example how coerced labour is accounted for since there are no entries to this 
effect and there is no calculation of anything resembling a ‘feudal surplus’.  
In addition to the payment of wages, not just to Besse Hobbes but to others 
employed on Lees Manor, Monteage’s system charges depreciation by reducing the 
value of the horses as ‘loss by their use’, crediting the horses account and debiting the 
                                                           
20 Wells (1978) uses Grange farm as an example of a departmental account. 
 
21 In this case the ‘increment to initial capital’ is not the same as the rate of return as a 
ratio. This is more than a matter of semantics, as the notion of calculative mentality 
requires precision vis a vis the method of calculation.  
 
22 Besse Hobbes is the sole employee on Monteage’s hypothetical Grange Farm. 
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loss and gain account.23 However, as Bryer suggests elsewhere, commenting on 
another 17th century farmer, Sir John Banks, ‘was not a capitalist’ (2006a, p.382) 
because he did not charge depreciation.  Therefore if Monteage’s example is capitalist 
by Bryer’s definition because the horses are depreciated, the result from the loss and 
gain cannot be described as a ‘feudal surplus’.  
Finally, there is no evidence of the ‘initial capital’ being used as a 
denominator in any of Monteage’s calculations, nor does the cited example show how 
profit is incremented to the initial capital and carried forward. What actually happens 
as far as Grange farm is concerned, is that profit of £136 is computed as cash received 
minus cash paid minus the loss of value of the lease during the accounting period. The 
only percentage rates specified in Monteage’s books are agreed commissions payable 
to factors and interest paid ‘at usuance’ to one creditor.24  
The numbers in calculations from Monteage and elsewhere do not relate to 
feudal surplus or the feudal rate of return, so there seems little or no evidence that 
such calculations were performed. In another example of 1618, Bryer (2000b, p.375) 
says the rate of return on the opening capital would be £85/£1455 = 5.8% (and) 
…Nicholas Toke could have calculated the feudal rate of return on capital’ (emphasis 
added). There is no evidence that Toke did any such calculation. Moreover, Toke was 
accountable only to himself and his father (Bryer, 2000b, p.374), and this hardly 
constitutes socialised capital. Similarly according to Bryer, (2000b, p.342), ‘These 
                                                           
23 Monteage (1675) ledger, p.4, ‘Horses’ a/c, ‘by loss and gain, lost by their use’. 
 
24 Monteage’s system would have enabled a return on capital calculation, because it 
computes loss and gain and aggregates assets from diverse activities in the balance 
account post depreciation (for the total estate the ratio is 1204/7151 x 100 = 16.8%), 
but although Monteage spends 45 pages outlining the advantages of his system with 
illustrative examples, he does not mention that it would allow such a calculation, nor 
does he provide one. 
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merchants (as discussed by Grassby, 1969) could have calculated the feudal rate of 
return on capital’ (emphasis added).25 
The earliest example of a specific rate of return calculation is the New Mills 
Cloth Manufactory, 1681 (Table 2). For Bryer, the company uses DEB to calculate 
the ‘feudal rate of return’ since there is no apparent allowance for depreciation (Bryer, 
2000a, p.146).26 Mepham (1988, p.62 citing Scott, 1905, lxxxiv-lxxxix) suggests that 
Sir James Stansfield computed forecasted profit in order to compare to the legal rate 
of interest. However there is no evidence in Scott of such calculations carried out by 
Stansfield and the only example is Scott’s own calculation of profits in excess of 25% 
(Scott, 1905, p.lvii) before deductions for the legal rate of interest on capital based on 
information from the prospectus (Memoriall). In a separate calculation recorded in the 
minute books, wear and tear is included (Walsh and Stewart, 1993, p.785), and is 
specifically used to determine product cost (minute #352, Scott, 1905, p.55-56). 
However, the charge seems to be partial, relating to some but not all of the capital 
equipment listed in the prospectus (Scott, 1905, p.lxxxviii) and there is no evidence of 
depreciation forming part of a ROCE calculation. Walsh and Stewart (1993, p.785) 
suggest that New Mills, c.1681-1703, used a customary rate of profit (16.66%) as a 
mark up on expenses, which reflected the notion of just price (for an example see 
minute #68, Scott, 1905, p.10-11).  
                                                           
25 In similar vein, rate of return calculations ‘as such’ are absent from the Bowes, 
White-Ridleys and Cotesworth business and estate papers (Oldroyd, 2007, p.105), but 
endeavouring to support Bryer’s view, Oldroyd on three occasions, suggests cases 
where underlying accounts ‘would have enabled’ entrepreneurs to calculate ROCE 
(2007, pp.113, 135). 
 
26 Bryer compares New Mills with New Lanark, and although he doesn’t provide any 
evidence of ROCE calculations at New Lanark, in contrast to New Mills, he does 
argue that it was capitalist because of real labour subsumption (2005, p.57). 
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At Carron, a forecasted rate of profit on capital was calculated in 1766 (Bryer 
(2006b, p.702), corresponding to some extent with ROCEBC (Tables 1, 2). The 
calculation involved a 10% notional interest charge and the expected rate was 
adjusted for risk, reflecting similarities with the accounting signatures of investors in 
the coal industry (discussed below). Carron employed significant fixed capital, 
including collieries, and as in the coal industry, calculations were ex ante. Ex post 
calculations, for example where concerned with accountability and cost control, were 
made with reference to profit levels, for example at the plating forge and the colliery 
(Fleischman and Parker, 1990, pp.215, 217). As Carron’s ownership became less 
socialised, the coherence of the accounts declined (Bryer, 2005, p.60), placing serious 
constraints on the possibility of accurate ROCE calculations. Factional division 
between the partners prevented them from imposing common standards of 
accountability, so that the managing partner, Joseph Stainton was able to enlarge his 
block shareholding and run the firm for his own benefit (Campbell, 1961, pp.170-80), 
but without making the firm any less ‘capitalist’. Consistent with Toms (2005) the 
evidence shows that the consequence of reduced socialisation is actually reduced 
accountability.  
The next main example in Table 2, Arthur Young’s illustration of the accounts 
of Mr Ruggles of Clare, in the period 1784-1787, is another possible early case of 
Bryer’s ROCEBC. According to Bryer (2000b, p.376), this is a ‘single-entry system for 
calculating the return on capital employed’, although this is not precisely consistent 
with the evidence. Young (1787, p.238) calculates the rate of profit as £205/£646, or 
31%. £205 is the average profit over four years and £646 is the capital advanced at the 
beginning of the period in the form of a stock valuation and the amount paid to the 
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preceding tenant for labour, rents and taxes.27  Like Loder, Ruggles (or Young on his 
behalf) uses residual income, and again the calculation has nothing to do with ROCE 
in the modern sense.28 Even so, Bryer (2000b, p.377) says ‘…that this profit is 
authentically capitalist is signatured by including in the expenses the decrease in 
value of the capital assets which “are no more” by £398 4s 1d. Buried in this charge is 
the depreciation of the livestock…’ (emphasis added). However, the depreciable 
assets at the beginning of the period were only valued at £289 in total. Because the 
original £646 is the combination of opening stock and an accrued payment for work 
done by the preceding tenant, split £289 and £357 respectively, when like is compared 
with like, the opening and closing stock values for the livestock, deadstock, manure 
tillage etc are £289 and £248 respectively. Only £41 can therefore be buried 
‘depreciation’, in the loosest sense (ie a difference between two stock valuations four 
years apart) and the remainder is a write off of accrued expenses.  
An important omission, from the point of view of Weber and Bryer, is the 
absence of a capital account, since Young makes no attempt to aggregate the assets at 
the period-end or reconcile the change in value to the profit figure.29 Meanwhile in a 
separate calculation Young (1788, p.238) believes the annual charge for ‘wear and 
tear’ is £30 and presumably this is Bryer’s ‘buried’ charge, but this is unrelated to 
                                                           
27 Curiously, the £205 is arrived at by deducting only three years’ interest, whereas the 
profit after interest, £180, is after deducting four years’ interest. The interest charged 
throughout was 5%, which compares with the official rate of 4.5% and the usury law 
limit of 5% (Pressnell, 1960, p.192). 
 
28 In all the examples of residual income accounting cited by Bryer (2005), the 
evidence amounts to a charge on capital, which might be expected in partnership 
accounting, without reference to whether the charge is on opening capital or how the 
cost of capital was derived. 
 
29 Such a calculation would have involved adding the value of unsold production, 
£660 and the £248 for livestock. Young does not provide details of Ruggles’s cash or 
drawings, so the closing capital cannot be ascertained or reconciled to the profit. 
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Ruggles’s cattle as the costing is for arable output only. In the absence of accuracy 
and any clear accounting for capital or definition of depreciation or consistent use it is 
difficult to draw any conclusion about the nature of these accounts, capitalist or 
otherwise. Similarly, for Coton Hall, (Table 2) whose accounts resembled Loder’s and 
Young’s (Bryer, 2006a, p.390), it can only be said that their procedures ‘allowed’, or 
meant that ROCE ‘could’, be calculated (Bryer, 2006a, pp.383, 386). Meanwhile, the 
only evidence of farmers actually calculating ROCE is in the late nineteenth century 
(Stamp, 1916, cited Bryer, 2006a, p.393).  
In several other cases (Table 2) capital charging computations were as 
important as ROCE calculations. Of the seven further examples cited by Bryer as 
using ROCE (2005, table 1, p.35), only three (Ashington, British Iron and Robert 
Morris) were using rate of return on assets calculations of any kind, two (Charlton and 
Mona) used capital charging, whilst Boulton and Watt used mark-up on cost30 and 
Thomas Hall used discounted cash flow (DCF) [Table 2]. Capital charging indicates 
the treatment of interest as a cost for the purpose of planning new ventures, but might 
equally be used in conjunction with partnership profit sharing systems for example at 
the Knight’s Stourbridge partnership where the partners credited their accounts with 
interest on undistributed capital (Pollard, 1963, p.80). In this sense, methods of 
accounting for profit by early industrialists are explained by capital socialisation 
through partnerships.   
 
Other evidence of ROCE calculations  
                                                                                                                                                                         
 
30 Specifically, Boulton and Watt include depreciation charges in arriving at cost 
(thereby satisfying one of Bryer’s conditions for a capitalist ROCE calculation) and 
add the required mark-up. 
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Pollard’s (1963, 1965) extensive surveys suggest few cases of ROCE calculations 
during the industrial revolution, although his evidence is disputed by Bryer. In 
particular, Pollard (1965, p.235) finds no evidence of ROCE calculations because 
capital mainly financed fluctuating current assets and liabilities. For Bryer (2005, 
p.40) this is proof that Pollard  
‘does not understand the modern meaning of capital employed…and seems unaware 
that the fluctuating balance of the owners' capital is the residual after profit or loss 
that, no matter how “wildly” it fluctuates, always does so around a positive capital 
employed, that is, the sum of assets. Pollard assumes management is not accountable 
for all its assets and its debts, that is, here he defines capital employed as owner's 
equity!’  
 
Even if it were true that Pollard does not understand the modern meaning of capital 
employed, it would not necessarily undermine his ability to recognise earlier forms of 
these calculations. Pollard meanwhile notices that loan finance was conflated with 
partners’ capital, attracting interest as a division of profit (Pollard, 1965, p.234) and 
rightly equates owners’ equity with net assets as capital employed. As in earlier times, 
interest rates used to determine the division of partners’ profits corresponded to the 
usury laws, for example the 5% rate used by the firm of Cowpe, Oldnow Siddon and 
Co. in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (Piggot, 1949, p.35). 
Conflation of partners’ loan and equity capital made it was entirely reasonable 
to expect early partnerships to have wildly fluctuating balances on their residual 
capital accounts. For example Edwards’s (1967, pp.255-58) analysis of the accounts 
of Birley which indicates that in 1796, the firm had fixed assets of £160, current 
assets of £182,764 and partners’ capital of c.£78,000 (estimate based on the capital of 
one of the partners, John Hornby, Edwards, [1967], p.255). The assets are for the 
weaving side of the business only, suggesting current assets, factoring in the spinning 
operation, for the total business in excess of £300,000. Capital fluctuations were 
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compounded by ordinary drawings, partners’ salaries and the requirement for capital 
withdrawals on partner retirements.31 
The use of forecast rates of return was common throughout the 18th century as 
evidence from textile firms such as Paul-Wyatt and J&N Phillips suggests 
(Wadsworth and Mann, 1931; Table 3). Such an approach, and indeed the use of 
credit terms at ‘tollerated interest’ with differential discount rates on bills of exchange 
by Thomas Marsden of Bolton in 1683 (Wadsworth and Mann, 1931, p.94), is 
consistent with the scholastic doctrine of lucrum cessans, and its reliance on ex ante 
estimates (there is no evidence of the capital employed being computed ex post in any 
of these cases). These might be described as separate transaction profit margin 
(STMP, Table 1) calculations and correspond to the practices of 17th century 
merchants described above (Grassby, 1985). 
In early industrial forms, such as the putting out system and in early textile 
factories, capital was owned by sub-contractors and employees and labour was only 
formally subsumed, so global ROCE calculations were rendered difficult and 
relatively useless by capital decentralisation, whilst the importance of bookkeeping 
was reinforced by attenuated social relations, moral hazard and contract enforcement 
requirements. Samuel Oldknow relied on a detailed double entry system debiting each 
weaver’s account with specification, quantity and price of yarn given out and credited 
with the quantity of cloth returned and wages paid. Oldknow and others received 
support from the development of small debtors’ courts and anti-embezzlement 
legislation (Unwin et al, pp.34-37, 48-50), and only used RI rather than ROCE 
calculations (table 3). 
                                                           
31 For example the partnership agreement of 1791 establishing the firm of McConnel 
Kennedy (MCK/1/2) 
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The organisation of productive forces determined the precise nature of profit 
calculations in other cases. Prior to 1780 there is no evidence of rate of return 
calculations in the estate accounts of three different mining entrepreneurs, although 
there is much detail on cost control (Oldroyd, 2007, p.107). Brackenborough et al 
(2001) attribute the sudden and widespread adoption of DCF in the North East 
coalfield around 1800 to technical and organisational changes in mining practice 
which increased the capital intensity of the typical operation. The use of DCF 
calculations at Thomas Hall is illustrative and the use of risk adjusted discount rates 
(in this case 12.5%) was a useful method of relating required return to the impact of 
geological and similar conditions on invested assets, analogous to the use of Sea Loan 
finance in the Renaissance period. Fleischman and Macve (2002) point out that the 
use of risk-adjusted rates of return on capital investment was a frequent feature of the 
calculations of investors in the North East coal industry, ranging from 6% to 15%, and 
incorporating sensitivity analysis, for example at Hetton colliery.32  The maximum rate of  interest allowed in law between 1714 and 1832 was 5% (Mathias, 1979, 
p.91),  and  used  as  the  risk  free  factor,  with  appropriate  additions  for  risk (Brackenborough  et  al.,  2001,  p.143). There were other examples from the 
extractive industries (Pollard, 1963, p.84, 1965, p.238, Taylor, 1980, pp.59-61),33 
                                                           
32 As Brackenborough et al (2001) explain in their review of a large number of these 
calculations, valuations were usually in monetary terms, although the medieval 
method using years’ purchase (Scorgie, 1996) was also used. Profit forecasts were 
based on combined effects of estimates of output, capacity, unit cost and selling price 
and capitalised as annuities. 
 
33 There is at least as much evidence of DCF calculations in the ‘semi-capitalist’ 
seventeenth century for the purposes of lease valuation (Lewin, 1970, Scorgie, 1996). 
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reflecting the underlying risky nature of the managed assets, although these 
sometimes contained ‘shocking’ inaccuracies.34 
Whereas the features of industrial organisation and finance influenced profit 
calculations, they were also modified by the effects of the usury laws until well into 
the nineteenth century. Businesses such as Birley and similar cotton concerns with 
large working capital balances depended on the use of bills of exchange for trade 
finance and demonstrated similar practices to Thomas Marsden over a century 
earlier.35 They could not ignore the 5% legal maximum without risking non-
enforceability of debts. An important component of profit calculation was a technique 
of usury law evasion employed by some firms, exemplified by McConnel and 
Kennedy, Evans and Sons of Derby and Strutts in their STMP calculations. These 
firms charged higher prices for their output but allowed customers to deduct a 
percentage in return for prompt payment. By setting terms of trade in this fashion and 
allowing discounts differentially by product, returns on book debts for these firms 
could vary between 7.5% at McConnel Kennedy and 20% for Evans candlewicks 
(Shapiro, 1967, pp.66-67).36 
In the mid nineteenth century the characteristic method of profit calculation 
used for measuring the economic performance of industrial enterprises was the return 
                                                           
34  So much so that the capital could not be ascertained on the subsequent dissolution 
of the firm and analysing the figures provided (Fleischman and Parker, p.139), it is 
impossible to reconcile the change in profit to the change in sales within any 
reasonable range of assumptions about change in assets or profit margins.   
 
35 Although these examples are taken from the cotton industry, the practice of using 
book credit to generate high implicit rates of return was quite general in the early 
modern period (North, 1691, p.7). 
  
36 McConnel Kennedy charged interest at 4% on capital invested in buildings and 
machinery, (table 1), but there is no evidence from their fairly comprehensive 
archives that they computed return to capital (see Lee, 1972, pp.139-141 on the 
intermittent nature of the underlying capital and profit measures that might have 
allowed ROCE calculations). 
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on capital advanced (ROCA, Table 1). Table 3 gives examples from the iron, shipping 
and textile industries from the 1830s and 1840s of the use of this method. A return of 
5% on ‘the original capital’ (British Parliamentary Papers [BPP], 1833, ev.6587, H. 
Tanner) is computed by a Select Committee member, notwithstanding the witness’s 
presentation of the ‘present value’ of shipping. There are similar references to the rate 
of profit on ‘the money embarked’ (BPP, 1846, ev.3930-3934, H. Ashworth) and 
projected rates of profit on the ‘sum invested’ (BPP, 1846, ev.4405, R.H. Greg).  
Similar calculations were performed at Bolckow Vaughn, and following the 
incorporation of businesses, investors computed a variant of ROCA using the return 
to (called-up) share capital (RSC), for example in the transport and utilities sectors 
(table 3).These methods bear some resemblance to Marx’s (1984, p.42) definition of 
the rate of profit discussed earlier.  
As capital became socialised in the hands of the portfolio investor, 
underpinned by the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 and Limited Liability Act 1855, 
new calculative methods emerged. Gladstonian finance repaid national debt quickly in 
this period but the demand for Consol-style investments expanded as the capital 
accumulated during industrialisation sought opportunities for diversification. Limited 
liability companies therefore issued fixed interest stock, in the form of loan stock, and 
increasingly from the 1880s debentures and preference shares, with the equity market 
only developing significantly after the 1880s (Cottrell, 2004, pp.257-279). For the 
investor, a common method of monitoring investment performance was the dividend 
as a return on the nominal capital. For example Owen Owens, a prominent 
Manchester merchant, monitored his railway portfolio in this fashion.37 Railways and 
                                                                                                                                                                         
 
37 Owen Owens Archive, John Rylands Library, OWN/3/2/4/11, OWN/1/1/1/4. In 
addition to railway investments, the Owens and his son John were serial investors 
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other incorporated firms that placed high reliance on preference share and loan capital 
in addition to ordinary shares, gave rise to what might be termed the weighted average 
net return (WANR, table 1) method. This calculation took dividend as a percentage of 
paid up capital and added interest on loans, debentures and preference shares using 
coupon rates, weighting each class of capital according to its paid up value. As a 
result the overall performance of the business could be assessed (Tyler, 1873).38 
When The Economist used the term ROCE when reporting cotton companies’ results 
(Table 3), its method was to take the simple average of dividend yield and bond 
coupon rate. To assist investors making judgements on the performance of individual 
firms, press analysis used physical profit per unit of physical capital (spindles) and 
RSC. There were two reasons why firms generally used these methods. First, because 
firms tended to distribute rather than accumulate profits (Toms, 1998, 2001; Church et 
al, 1994, p.711), and second, because the taxation system did not allow an accurate 
imputation of pre-tax and pre-interest profits (Seligman, 1914). A similar approach 
was to compute the weighted average gross return (WAGR, Table 1) using the profit 
as a percentage of called up share capital instead of dividend in the calculation 
described above (for examples see Table 3).  
In general, dividends were the principal performance measure for equity 
investors. The use of profit rates on equity instead of dividend yields to value shares, 
was delayed by the Wall Street crash, and in Britain investors continued their 
nineteenth century fixation with dividend yield for much longer (Rutterford, 2004, 
pp.136-8). Such approaches influenced the perception and calculation of ROCE. As 
                                                                                                                                                                         
(Toms, 2005, p.343),  the proceeds of which contributed to a bequest leading to the 
establishment of Owens College, (Heywood, 1878, p.539), later the University of 
Manchester. 
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late as 1937, the Economist was using an RSC measure (profits as a ratio to issued 
capital) rather than using accumulated equity in the capital employed measure (Table 
3).  
The above discussion has shown that ROCE calculations in the return on 
investment (ROI, Table 1) sense were the exception rather than the rule before 1840 
and investors’ used variants of ROCA for a long period thereafter. So when did 
modern ROCE calculations emerge? The use of ROI incorporating all capital invested 
and associated monitoring of returns emerged as a management rather than an 
external investor ratio. In this context, its use reflected the integration of previously 
specialised businesses, for example Du Pont’s integration of the Gunpowder Trade 
Association after 1903. Integration of production, sales and purchasing provided the 
basis of the analytical system of measuring return of investment developed by Dupont 
after 1914 (Previts and Merino, 1998, Johnson and Kaplan, 1987, p.66-88). In Britain, 
there are relatively few examples in the early twentieth century, Campion’s (1934) 
calculation (Table 3) being an exception. At Hawthorne Leslie shipbuilders on 
Tyneside, similar ROI type calculations were performed by the company’s auditors, 
Messrs. Monkhouse Goddard and Co., by reference to the three departments in the 
period 1896-1902, although the capital allocations suggested were arbitrary and the 
resulting figures treated with some scepticism by the management (McLean, 2006, 
p.117). ROI along these lines also reflects entity theory, which argues the objective of 
business is to increase the wealth of all sources of financing and which was not 
recognised until 1922 (Paton, 1922).39 Only with the unification of industrial and 
                                                                                                                                                                         
38 Dividends also formed the basis of share valuation (Farr, 1873, who also dismisses 
the LTV). 
39 Although the origins of entity theory is commonly attributed to Paton (Zambon and 
Zan, 2000, p.809), it has been argued that there were Italian precursors (Zambon, 
1996, Zan, 1994). 
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financial capital from the early part of the twentieth century onwards (Hilferding, 
1981), might ROI calculations be viewed as simultaneously conveying the same 
information to managers and investors alike. 
In summary, the evidence suggests that far from a unified calculative 
mentality developing concomitantly with the emergence and maturity of capitalism, 
the story is one of adaptation according to historical stages of productive development 
and capital socialisation and restrictions on capital socialisation. Scholasticism and 
the commercial values of the early enlightenment impacted upon the nature and 
disclosure of profit calculations, which in combination with the rise of the portfolio 
investor and  decentralised production, restricted the extent and disclosure of return 
on capital calculations in general before 1840 and ROCE calculations in particular 
prior to 1914. Whereas it may be true that landlords, manufacturing entrepreneurs and 
ultimately managers were concerned to earn excess return on capital, there is no 
evidence in this case that it comes from a capitalist mentality of pursuing ROCE, 
since there are few surviving examples of such calculations being performed.  
There is accordingly value in attempting to explain the British Industrial 
Revolution in terms of calculative mentality, but not in terms of the adoption of 
ROCE calculations alone. If the variations in ROCE calculations set out in table 1 are 
applied to the empirical evidence, the approximate story is as follows. In feudal times 
there was no distinct notion of profit so no expectation of return other than to 
compensate for entrepreneurial labour and risk at a just price. The transitional period 
from the mid 16th century onwards was characterised by RI style calculations as 
entrepreneurs used the legal rate of usuance to cost their invested capital. 
Industrialisation based on embryonic single unit specialised production, prompted 
                                                                                                                                                                         
 
 40 
ROCA style calculations because capital was accumulated by individuals and not 
within the pre-corporate business unit. After the legalisation of joint stock companies 
from the mid-nineteenth century capital socialised with the emergence of portfolio 
investor, whose priority was dividends. Investor ratios stressing called up share 
capital and dividends therefore predominated. Separation of managerial and investor 
functions provide a separate genealogy for ROI style calculations, which have their 
origin at least in a managerial calculative mentality, as they are required to account 
for ever more diverse capital deployments.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Although the above discussion has been critical of Bryer’s notion of the calculative 
mentality, it is nonetheless recognised that his contribution is an important next step 
in the Sombart-Weber debate. The present paper is intended as a step further. Instead 
of the association between capitalism and basic accounting techniques, the concern 
has been the rationale behind accounting calculation, and therefore with the mentality 
of economic decision-makers. Whilst accepting Bryer’s broad view, his narrow view 
has been challenged. In particular, Bryer uses the capitalist mentality to predict 
behaviour in all forms of capitalism with only partial reference to the organisation of 
productive forces, leading to over-reliance on ROCEBC as the accounting signature of 
interest to the accounting historian.  
Instead the evidence shows a wide diversity of calculative method and the 
appeal of this paper is to call for greater recognition of alternative accounting 
signatures. If accepted, then mapping these calculations is a new and important part of 
the research agenda. A start has been made in the analysis above, but the scope of the 
paper is wide, so only limited depth has been given in each case. Also the paper only 
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covers up to the interwar period, when what might be described as the ROCE method 
used in today’s accounting textbooks began to come into use. Significant 
developments after this time, such as the introduction of tax imputation systems and 
the rise of shareholder ideology could also be considered. Further archival work is 
necessary, particularly to evidence the actual calculations performed by entrepreneurs, 
managers, and investors in different periods, either to confirm the commonality of 
accounting signatures or to record exceptions and to explain them. Inter-firm 
comparisons within industries where accounting practices are known to have varied, 
for example railway and canal companies, provide further opportunities to refine and 
revise the arguments set out in this paper. For the pre-Tudor period, archival work is 
difficult, in view of the hypothesis of no or very restricted profit calculations, and the 
argument may have to be borne out as in this paper, with further interpretation of 
scholastic tracts. For later periods contemporary publications and circulars in contexts 
where business people are required to explain economic performance in accounting 
terms are also likely to be productive sources of enquiry. 
The review of evidence uncovered so far of the employment of ROCE 
calculations shows that most early modern and industrial revolution entrepreneurs did 
not make use of such calculations, and their partial use and later adoption reflected 
both the specialised organisation of production and narrow social ownership of 
capital. There is evidence to suggest that the methods of calculating and dividing 
profit emerged in tandem with institutions that governed the accumulation and 
distribution of profit, particularly the mechanisms for interest rate regulation. Early or 
transitional capitalism contains only partial aspects of the calculations necessary for 
the computation of ROCE, which is why there are only limited and partial examples 
before 1900. The slow retreat of feudalism offers many examples of how religion uses 
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accounting to impose social order. Its replacement with secular, but personal (as 
opposed to corporate) capitalism further slowed the adoption of modern accounting 
calculations in Britain. Modern capitalism as a mentality required the demise first of 
usury in the courts and associated restrictions on risk free returns, and then of the 
labour theory of value in the realm of political economy. Only then could the doctrine 
of capital as a sui generis factor of production emerge and demand its own return, 
independent of rent and wages, as profit, and only then was the computation and 
analysis of profit and profitability made possible. 
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Table 1: Definitions of Return to capital measures 
 
 
Calculative method Abbreviation Definition 
Generic return on capital 
employed 
ROCE Any ratio obtained by dividing some 
measure of profit (as a flow of income) 
by some measure of capital (as a stock 
of wealth).  
Bryer’s ‘feudal rate of 
return’ 
ROCEBF   Feudal surplus divided by the initial 
capital advanced.* 
Bryer’s capitalist Return 
on capital employed 
ROCEBC    Return on capital employed in 
production** 
Mark ups on cost 
 
PC Profit divided by production cost 
Discounted cash flow DCF Net forecast revenue multiplied by a 
discount factor 
Separate transaction 
profit margin 
STPM Transaction profit divided by transaction 
value 
Profit per physical unit 
of capital 
PPC Net profit divided by physical number 
of units of capital 
Residual income RI Net profit minus a charge for capital 
Return on capital 
advanced 
ROCA   Net profit divided by initial capital 
advanced  
Weighted average net 
return 
WANR  Dividend as a percentage of paid up 
capital x interest on loans, debentures 
and preference shares weighted 
according to paid up values and using 
coupon rates. 
Weighted average gross 
return 
WAGR  Interest on debt capital plus return on 
equity capital weighted according to 
paid up values and using coupon rates. 
Return on subscribed 
capital 
RSC   Net profit divided by called up share 
capital 
Return on investment 
 
ROI   Net Earnings (after depreciation and 
before interest on long term debt) 
divided by net assets (total assets minus 
goodwill and intangibles minus current 
liabilities)*** 
 
 
Sources: 
* Bryer (2005, p.29-30) 
**  Bryer, (2000a, p.146) 
***  For example the DuPont formulation, Johnson and Kaplan (1987, p.89, note 
13). 
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Table 2: Profitability analysis in the agricultural and industrial revolutions: Examples cited by 
Bryer 
 
Example Date Industry Method used according to Bryer/ 
Commentary 
Sources 
Robert Loder of 
Romney Marsh 
1611 Agriculture Residual Income  
 
Interest charged on part of total capital ( 
invested in crops)  
Bryer 2005, p.39 
 
Freer, 1970, p.28. 
Grange Farm 
(Monteage) 
1675 Agriculture ROCEBF 
 
DEB system incorporating depreciation 
Bryer, 2005, p.37 
 
Monteage, 1675. 
New Mills 
Cloth 
Manufactory 
1681 Textiles ROCEBF  
Forecast profit rate c/f interest rate 
 
Separate computations of forecast 
revenue and cost (wages plus capital 
expenditure plus materials) 
Mark up on cost 16 2/3% 
Bryer, 2000, p.146 
Mepham, 1988, p.62 
 
Scott, 1905, pp.lxxxvii-ix 
 
 
Scott, 1905, pp.10-11 
Robert Morris 
Copper smelting 
co. 
1726 Metal ROCEBC  
 
Forecast profit on advanced as fixed 
capital plus stock  
Bryer, 2005, table 1 
 
Jones, 1985, p.20 
Coton Hall 1744 Agriculture  ROCEBC 
 
Change in cash plus opening minus 
closing capital values 
Bryer 2006a, p.383 
 
Bryer, 2006a pp.383-6 
Carron 1766 Metals  ROCEBC 
 
Forecasted profit with 10% notional 
interest 
Bryer, 2006b 
 
Bryer, 2006b 
Mr Ruggles 
(Arthur Young's 
example) 
1788 Agriculture ROCEBC  
 
RI: Notional interest charged on capital 
advanced as stock and accrued expenses 
Bryer 2000b, p.376 
 
Young, 1788, pp.235-244 
Mona Mine 1793-
1800 
Coal ROCEBC   
 
RI: 10% charge on capital 
Bryer, 2005, table 1 
 
Boyns & Edwards, 1997, p.52 
Boulton and 
Watt 
1801 
 
1790s 
Hardware ROCEBC    
 
PC: 40% mark-up on cost 
PC: Various mark ups on cost 
Bryer, 2005, table 1 
 
Roll, 1930, p.248; 
Williams, 1997, p.206; 
Williams 1999,pp.79-82 
Charlton Mills 1810 Textiles ROCEBC  
  
RI: 5% charge on capital 
Bryer, 2005, table 1 
 
Stone, 1973, p.77. 
British Iron Co.  1826 Metal ROCEBC   
 
Forecasted rate from promoters’ cost 
estimates 
Bryer, 2005, table 1 
 
Jones, 1985, p.216 
Thomas Hall 1834-
1835 
Coal ROCEBC   
 
DCF: Forecast profit  discounted at risk 
12.5% 
Bryer, 2005, table 1 
 
Fleischman & Parker, 1997, 
p.130. 
Ashington 
Colliery 
1843 Coal ROCEBC   
 
ROCA: Projected return on initial 
capital  
Bryer, 2005, table 1 
 
Fleischman & Parker, 1997, 
p.139. 
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Table 3: Profitability analysis in the agricultural and industrial revolutions: Other examples 
 
Example Date Industry Method used & details Sources 
Thomas Marsden 
of Bolton 
1683 
 
Textiles 
 
STPM: 5% for credit on bills, at 
‘tollerated interst’. 
Wadsworth and Mann, 1931, p.94. 
Paul-Wyatt 1744 Textiles ROCA: Forecast rate of profit on 
capital = 20% on fixed capital, 
15% on circulating capital 
Wadsworth and Mann, 1931, 
p.439 
J & N Philips and 
Co 
1765 Textiles ROCA: Forecast rate of profit on 
capital = 5% 
Wadsworth and Mann, p.291 
Samuel Oldknow, 
Mellor Mill   
1797 Textiles RI: Interest on machinery, 10%, 
5% interest on capital 
Unwin et al, 1924, p.195, 201; 
Williams, 1997, p.145. 
Northumberland 
mines generally 
1800 
 
1818 
Coal DCF: Discounting using risk 
adjusted interest rates 
DCF: Revenue capitalising using 
risk adjusted interest rate 
Brackenborough el al, 2001, 
p.143. 
Pollard, 1965 p.238. 
McConnel Kenn., 
Evans, Strutts 
1800-
1830 
Textiles 
 
STPM: Bills discounted 
differentially, 7.5-20% 
Shapiro, 1967, pp.66-8. 
 
McConnel 
Kennedy 
1833 Textiles RI: 4% charge to capital invested 
in buildings and machinery 
JRUL*, MCK 3/1/2 Nominal 
ledger, 1833, pp.41, 71. 
Various 
commercial and 
manufacturing 
1833 Iron 
Shipping 
ROCA: Profit on originally 
invested capital 
Select Com. on Commerce, 
Manufacturers, and Shipping, 
BPP**, ev. S. Gurney, pp.11, H. 
Tanner, p.402.   
Ashworth Cotton 
Co., 
RH Greg 
1846 Textiles 
Agriculture 
ROCA: Profit on originally 
invested capital 
Select Com. on Burdens Affecting 
Real Property, BPP, ev. H. 
Ashworth,  p.335, ev RH Greg, 
pp.381-382.  
Bolckow Vaughn 1866 Coal ROCA: Expected rate of return 
on shareholders’ funds = 15% 
Church et al, 1994, p.716. 
Metropolitan 
Railway 
1872 Transport RSC: Net profit divided by called 
up share capital 
Chadwick’s Investment Circular, 
3rd September, 1872. 
New River 
Waterworks 
1873 Utilities 
 
RSC: Net profit divided by called 
up share capital.  
Farr, 1876, p.520. Also a general 
calculation for firms with different 
classes of capital, p.509. 
Railway Cos. 1870s Transport WANR: Weighted average net 
return** 
Tyler, 1873, p.262. 
Oldham ‘limiteds’ 1880s 
1890s 
Textiles PPC: Profit per spindle 
RSC: Net profit divided by called 
up share capital 
Oldham Chronicle, passim, and 
respective specific examples 4th 
January, 1890 Oldham Chronicle, 
3rd January, 1891.  
Cotton companies 1895-
1900s 
Textiles WAGR: Weighted average gross 
return*** 
 
RSC: Net profit divided by called 
up share capital 
The Economist, 22nd February, 
1895, pp.26-27. Economist, 1896, 
p.27) 
Economist (passim, & eg, 1902, 
p.32) 
Economist (1901, p.29) 
Hawthorn Leslie 1896-
1902 
Ship-
building 
ROI: Returns on departmental 
capitals 
McLean (2006, p.117) 
Cotton companies 1934 Textiles ROI: Return on capital employed  Campion, (1934), p.268 
Economy wide 
survey article 
1937 All sectors RSC: Profit divided by total 
issued capital (ordinary and pref.) 
Economist, ‘Swelling profits’, 16th 
January, 1937, p.106. 
 
* The John Rylands University Library, University of Manchester. ** British Parliamentary Papers.  
 
 
